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Non-Technical Summary
Living arrangements have undergone considerable change in recent decades. In most
Western countries marriage is no longer the exclusive context of family formation. In
the former Federal Republic of Germany, about 38.3 percent of the women born between
1954 and 1958 started their rst union outside of a formal marriage. The gure increases
to 67.9 percent for the cohort 1964 - 1968 (Le Goff, 2002). These demographic trends
challenge the microeconomic literature in which couples living in consensual unions are
implicitly assumed to act exactly as married couples.
A closer look at the literature reveals, however, growing evidence of the link between
marital status and household behavior with respect to many outcomes. For instance,
DeLeire and Kalil (2005) nd that cohabiting-parent families spend a greater amount
on alcohol and tobacco, and a smaller amount on education and health care than married-
parent families. Cohen (2002), Mamun (2004) and Stratton (2002) examine the wage
differential for married and cohabiting men. Higher wages are observed for married men,
ceteris paribus. There is also evidence, based on US cross section data, that married cou-
ples exhibit a more `traditional' division of domestic and market work than cohabitants
(South and Spitze 1994, Stratton, 2005).
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the shift from cohabitation to mar-
riage is associated with a signicant change in household market and non-market labor
supply. More specically, we use a long German panel (GSOEP) to test whether the
transition from cohabitation to marriage reinforces the degree of specialization among
couples. We estimate a model that relates married life to the female-to-male domestic and
market work hours log ratios. Other regressors of the log ratios are the female relative
earnings, the number of children and the duration of the relationship.We account for se-
lection bias in the presence of endogenous regressors following the procedure advocated
in Semykina and Wooldridge (2005), that we adapt to system GMM estimation.
Our results suggest that marriage increases female specialization in home-based activ-
ities. Importantly, marriage leads to a fall in womenï¿1
2
s leisure, particularly for couples
with pre-school children. The results also exhibit a fall in married menï¿1
2
s leisure com-
ing from either a rise in market hours or an increase in domestic hours depending on the
specication.
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1 Introduction
Living arrangements have undergone considerable change in recent decades. In most
Western countries marriage is no longer the exclusive context of family formation. In
the United States (US) for instance, the number of unmarried couples nearly doubled in
the 1990s, from 3:2 million couples in 1990 to 5:5 million couples in 2000 (source: U.S.
Census Bureau). Le Goff (2002) reports that in the case of French women born between
1944 and 1948, 22 percent started their rst union as a cohabiting union. For the cohort
1964 1968, this applies to 81 percent. In the former Federal Republic of Germany, about
38:3 percent of the women born between 1954 and 1958 started their rst union outside
of a formal marriage. The gure increases to 67:9 percent for the cohort 1964   1968
(Le Goff, 2002). These demographic trends challenge the microeconomic literature in
which couples living in consensual unions are implicitly assumed to act exactly as married
couples.
A closer look at the literature reveals, however, growing evidence of the link between
marital status and household behavior with respect to many outcomes. Using data from
the US consumer expenditure survey, DeLeire and Kalil (2005) nd that cohabiting-parent
families spend a greater amount on alcohol and tobacco, and a smaller amount on edu-
cation and health care than married-parent families. Cohen (2002), Mamun (2004) and
Stratton (2002) examine the wage differential for married and cohabiting men. Higher
wages are observed for married men, ceteris paribus. McConocha et al. (1993) compare
nancial decisions between cohabiting, remarried and married couples. More recently,
Rangel (2006) uses a sample of married Brazilian couples as a control group to identify
the effect of extending alimony rights to cohabitants on adults' time allocation and in-
vestments in the education of children. There is also evidence, based on US cross section
data, that married couples exhibit a more `traditional' division of domestic and market
work than cohabitants (South and Spitze 1994, Stratton, 2005).1
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the shift from cohabitation to mar-
riage is associated with a signicant change in household market and non-market labor
supply. More specically, we use a long German panel (GSOEP) to test whether the
transition from cohabitation to marriage reinforces the degree of specialization among
couples. We estimate a model that relates married life to the female-to-male domestic and
market work hours log ratios. Other regressors of the log ratios are the female relative
earnings, the number of children and the duration of the relationship. We account for se-
lection bias in the presence of endogenous regressors following the procedure advocated
in Semykina and Wooldridge (2005), that we adapt to system GMM estimation.
Our results suggest that marriage increases female specialization in home-based ac-
tivities. Importantly, marriage leads to a fall in women's leisure, particularly for couples
with pre-school children. The results also exhibit a fall in married men's leisure com-
ing from either a rise in market hours or an increase in domestic hours depending on the
specication.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 exposes the theoretical underpinning for
the effects of marriage and cohabitation on market and non-market labor supply. Section
3 discusses the empirical specications. Section 4 exposes the econometric issues. The
data are described in Section 5. The results are presented in Section 6, and Section 7
concludes.
1Waite (1995) offers a survey of the effects of marriage and cohabitation on health, mortality, children's
well-being, assets and labor.
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2 Theoretical background
The economic motivations which lie behind the existence of the household have been ex-
tensively discussed in the literature. At least since Becker (1973), it has been commonly
argued that one of the reasons for household formation is that it allows household mem-
bers to specialize efciently on activities in which each has a comparative advantage.
One partner can specialize in non-market household activities while the other special-
izes in market work. The distinction between legal marriage and consensual union is not
formally stated and the word spouses usually refers to two individuals living together.
However, several arguments exist in the economic literature to predict that cohabitants
specialize less than married couples.
First, cohabitants are often seen as playing non-cooperatively (Nordblom, 2004 and
references therein). Cohabitations are usually shorter lived than marriages (Brien et al.,
2006; Bumpass and Sweet, 1995) and there is consensus to admit that cooperation is more
likely to occur in stable couples, committed in a long term relationship. Stratton (2005)
also puts forward the hypothesis that specialization is closely related to perceived house-
hold stability. Using US data, she presents some empirical evidence that the degree of
specialization is greater within married couples compared to cohabitants. In contrast to
cooperative settings, efcient specialization is less likely for couples playing strategically.
For instance, Lundberg (2002) considers a bargaining model of intrahousehold allocation
in a multi-period setting with limited commitment. Members are unable to make credible
promises regarding future behavior.2 Inefcient levels of specialization and underprovi-
sion of household public good are likely outcomes. Basu (2006) species a bargaining
model with an endogenous balance of power between partners and no intertemporal com-
mitment. He shows that strategic considerations can lead to inefcient outcomes.
Second, consensual unions offer less legal protection than marriage. Married spouses
are often obliged to care for each other and spousal maintenance is anticipated after di-
vorce. Cohabitation provides individuals with less risk-sharing opportunities than mar-
riage. That may prevent individuals from specializing in home-based activities and house-
hold production skills. Cohabitants are thus less likely to specialize in household specic
human capital. In this vein, Nordblom (2004) considers a model where married couples
have legal restrictions on their relationship that force them to act cooperatively, while
cohabitants with limited commitment act non-cooperatively. This makes precautionary
savings greater for cohabitants than for married couples.3 In Germany, the article 6 of
the Constitution obliges the state to promote the institutions of marriage and the family
through its legislation and to prevent any situation which could disadvantage these in-
stitutions (Stintzing, 1999). One spouse is obliged to support the other before the latter
is entitled to subsidies from the state and this support is tax-deductible. This is not the
case for cohabitants. In addition, the economic consequences of partnership dissolution
are different for married couples and cohabiting couples. The German Constitution does
not impose maintenance payments after non-marital separation. However, child support
payment is anticipated. In 1994, suggestions to extend the protection of marriage to any
form of long-term cohabitation were not approved by Parliament.
Finally, income tax distorts the allocation of time between married and cohabiting
couples whenever they are subjected to different income tax schedules. In Germany, mar-
ried couples can opt for the splitting system. Spouses' income is aggregated and halved,
and the tax schedule is applied to this tax base. Married couples thus prot from a more
2See also Wells and Maher (1998).
3Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Anderberg (2003) also study risk sharing between spouses.
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favorable taxation in the case of an asymmetric earnings situation between the spouses
(Gustafsson, 1992). As a result, tax saving is maximized for one earner households, or if
partners combine full-time/part-time employment. From a theoretical perspective, Wrede
(2003) analyzes among others things, the effect of joint taxation on specialization. Under
the assumption that partners allocate their time efciently between market and non-market
activities through a Nash bargaining process, he shows that family members specialize
more in reaction to joint taxation. Most importantly, only married couples can opt for the
splitting system in Germany, while cohabitants face individual taxation. To the extent that
it implies higher marginal tax rates on the rst earner and lower marginal tax rates on the
secondary earner, cohabitants have fewer incentives for specialization, ceteris paribus.
3 Empirical Specications
We consider a household i consisting of a female (f ) and a male (m), that makes decisions
about market work, non-market work, marital status and consumption. Let Married
be a dummy variable denoting the marital status of the couple, with Married = 1 if
married and 0 if cohabiting. Each partner p (p = m; f ) offers lp > 0 hours on the
labor market at wage rate wp and spends hp > 0 hours in domestic work. Following
Pollak and Wachter (1975) and Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987), we model the demand
for consumption and the allocation of time by assuming that households or individuals
maximize a utility function with goods and time spent on market and non-market activities
as arguments. The allocation of time among market and non-market activities is thus
expressed as a function of prices, wage rates and non-labor incomes.
There are several ways of taking marital status into account in the utility function.
In Couprie (2007), Gray (1997) and Lundberg and Rose (2002), to name a few, marital
status is a predetermined variable. Current shocks on labor supply do not inuence cur-
rent marital status. The utility function at time t is a function of current marital status
but is maximized with respect to consumption goods and leisure only. Also, marital sta-
tus can be seen as a preference parameter that may vary over time. Couples may move
from cohabitation to marriage and this change is likely to modify the allocation of time
among market and non-market activities but marital status is not a choice variable per se.
However, it could be that marital status and the allocation of time are interrelated choices.
Van der Klaauw (1996) explicitly studies their interdependence. In a life-cycle setting,
the interaction between female labor force participation (not hours) and marital decision
(married or single) is examined. Participation and marital status are the choice variables
over which the utility function is maximized. Brien et al. (2006) estimate a model of
non-marital cohabitation, marriage and divorce. They examine union formation and dis-
solution in the presence of uncertain match quality. They do not consider labor supply
issues. Brien et al. (1999) focus on the interrelationship of cohabitation, marriage and
childbearing while Lillard et al. (1995) analyze premarital cohabitation and the stability
of later marriages.
In this paper, we estimate models with marriage assumed predetermined and models
with endogenous marriage. We do not specify a structural model for the interaction be-
tween marital status and time use but take this relation in reduced form via instrumental
variables use in the market and non-market hours equations.
Also, we ignore the issue of union formation and dissolution. Our estimates may
then suffer from selection bias but this problem is general to the labor supply literature.
The analysis is usually done conditionally on household formation. We follow the bulk
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of the literature on this matter.4 Our results must be interpreted conditionally on couple
formation.
Finally, conditioning the analysis on couples with strictly positive labor supplies also
raises the problem of selectivity bias. We test and correct for it.
We now present our base model. To analyze the extent of specialization within house-
holds, we specify a two-equation system that relates marriage, relative earnings and a set
of preference factors to the female-to-male domestic and market work hours log ratios.
3.1 The domestic and market work hours (log) ratios
The base specication is one that is often encountered in the literature. It was already used
in a unitary framework (Kiker and Ng, 1990) as well as in a collective setting (Browning
and Gørtz, 2006)5 and explains the shares of domestic and market work:
ln(rhit) = hMarriedit + h ln(
wf
wm
) + hYit + 
0
hZit + "
h
it
ln(rlit) = lMarriedit + l ln(
wf
wm
) + lYit + 
0
lZit + "
l
it; (1)
where rh = hf
hm
is the female-to-male domestic (home) work hours ratio, rl = lf
lm
the
female-to-male labor market work hours ratio, Y is the household non-labor income, Z
is a vector of household characteristics including the constant term, " is a conformable
error term, and , ,  and  are the parameters to be estimated. The subscript i indicates
household and t indicates time.
Now we turn to the expected signs of the variables included in our empirical spec-
ication. As pointed out above, we expect a negative impact of marriage on women's
relative hours on paid work (rl) and a positive effect on women's relative hours on unpaid
work (rh). The overall effect on female relative leisure is undetermined a priori. Relative
earnings ( wf
wm
) are expected to be positively related to rl and negatively to rh. Again, the
overall effect on relative leisure is undetermined. Non-labor income has a positive effect
on partners' leisure (if leisure is a normal good) but its impact on rh and rl is ambiguous.
We expect the specialization in home-based activities to increase with the duration of
the relationship. To capture this effect we include a series of dummy variables Dur2,
Dur3, Dur4 and Dur5 indicating the relationship duration in number of years.6 Also,
the number and age of children are likely to inuence the extent of specialization within
the family. In line with the effect of children on female labor supply documented in the
literature, we expect children to have a positive incidence on rh and a negative impact on
rl. We include the number of children under ve and the number of children older than
four in our specication.
One might argue that time allocation within the household is sensitive to generational
effects. More precisely, younger cohorts might exhibit a more equal division of domestic
work and paid labor. To test this hypothesis we include three cohort dummies in our
model. Other factors such as nationality, regional disparities and religion may inuence
4See Blundell et al. (1998), Chiappori et al. (2002), and Pencavel (2006) among others.
5In the unitary framework, it is assumed that households, irrespective of the number of household mem-
bers, behave as single decision makers. The collective setting introduced by Chiappori (1988) and Apps and
Rees (1988) takes into account several decision makers and the bargaining process. See also the seminal
paper of McElroy and Horney (1981) for a Nash-bargaining model applied to household behavior.
6 Dur2 = 1[5  duration < 10]; Dur3 = 1[10  duration< 15]; Dur4 = 1[15  duration < 20] and
Dur5 = 1[ duration  20].
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the intrafamily allocation of time. The dummy variable German00 is dened as 1 for
non-German couples and 0 otherwise, German10 takes on the value 1 for couples with
a German male partner and a non-German female partner whereas German01= 1 for
couples with a non-German male partner and a German female partner. Our control group
is German couples. Included regions of residence are the southern and middle states of
West Germany, Baden-Württenberg, Rheinland Pfalz, Saarland and Bavaria. In contrast
to the Protestant northern states, these regions include a majority of Catholics.7
3.2 Alternative formulations
We also focus on the effect of marriage on the allocation of time between domestic and
market work. We rst consider a two-equation system that relates marital status, the
female wage and the female unearned income (household non-labor income together with
male labor earnings) to the female non-market and market labor supply. This setting is
consistent with the theoretical models that assume the male allocation of time to be rigid.8
Actually, as exposed in Section 5, German men exhibit little variation in their number of
domestic and market hours. This alternative specication is:
hfit = lMarriedit + llog(w
f
it) + lY
f
it + 
0
lZit + "
l
it
lfit = hMarriedit + hlog(w
f
it) + hY
f
it + 
0
hZit + "
h
it; (2)
where Y f is the female unearned income. Other variables are the same as before. The
female wage is expected to have a positive effect on market hours and a negative effect
on domestic hours. The female unearned income is expected to reduce women's hours in
paid work.
Although men's labor supply is more concentrated than women's, there is some varia-
tion in the male allocation of time. We then specify a four-equation model where the male
market and non-market labor supply are supposed to be exible. Formally, we estimate
the following system:
hfit = lfMarriedit + lf log(w
f
it) + lf log(w
m
it ) + lfYit + 
0
lfZit + "
lf
it (3)
lfit = hfMarriedit + hf log(w
f
it) + hf log(w
m
it ) + hfYit + 
0
hfZit + "
hf
it
hmit = lmMarriedit + lmlog(w
f
it) + lmlog(w
m
it ) + lmYit + 
0
lmZit + "
lm
it
lmit = hmMarriedit + hmlog(w
f
it) + hmlog(w
m
it ) + hmYit + 
0
hmZit + "
hm
it ;
that corresponds to a general unrestricted model of household behavior. The covariates
are the same as those of the base specication.
4 Econometric issues
In this section we discuss econometric issues that arise with our specication and we
present our estimation method. We draw heavily upon Semykina and Wooldridge (2005).
For the sake of simplicity, we consider one equation of interest to be estimated. All results
can be easily generalized to a system of equations. A formal derivation is in Appendix A.
We have:
yit = xit + "it; (4)
7Religious preferences are asked in the GSOEP but contain a lot of missing values.
8Blundell et al. (2005), Donni (2007) and Donni and Moreau (2007) deal with the rigidity of the man's
behavior in a collective framework.
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where xit is a 1K vector of explanatory variables,  is aK  1 vector of parameters to
be estimated, and "it is the error term.
First, we control for household-specic xed effects ci, which captures all unobserved
household-specic heterogeneity in the labor supply that remains constant over time. The
error term is then expressed as "it = ci + uit, where uit are the idiosyncratic errors.
We allow for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory
variables. In addition, we allow some elements of xit to be endogenous (that is, correlated
with the idiosyncratic error, uit). Let zit a 1L (L  K) vector of instruments which are
strictly exogenous conditional on ci.
As previously mentioned, we focus our analysis on a sample of couples with strictly
positive labor supply. Let sit a binary selection rule that takes on the value 1 if the couple
exhibits strictly positive market and non-market labor supply at period t, and 0 otherwise.
Whether sit equals 1 or 0, xit and zit are always observed.
Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) SW hereafter  show that applying the usual xed
effect two-stage least squares (FE-2SLS) estimator to the selected sample yields consis-
tent estimates if sit is completely random technically sit is independent of (uit; zit; ci)
in all periods or if sit is a deterministic function of (zi; ci), where zi = (zi1; : : : ; ziT ).
Thus, in order to obtain consistent estimates one should carry out a formal test for sample
selection and apply a correction method if necessary.
In what follows, we briey sketch the procedure proposed by SW for linear xed
effects models.9 The selection indicator sit is generated by means of a latent variable sit
such that:
sit = 1[s

it > 0] = 1[zit + ai +  it > 0];
where 1[:] is the indicator function, ai is an unobserved effect and  it is an error term
dened such that  it j zi; ei  N(0; 1), so that sit follows an unobserved effect probit
model. To allow ai to be correlated with zi, SW specify, following Mundlak (1978),
ai =  + zi + fi; (5)
where zi is a vector of individual exogenous variables averaged across periods of time,
and fi j zi has a zero mean normal distribution. Hence, the selection indicator sit is
rewritten as:
sit = 1[ + zit + zi + vit > 0]; (6)
where vit = (fi +  it) has a zero mean normal distribution.
Now, suppose that ("it; vi) is independent of (zi; ci), where vi = (vi1; : : : ; viT )0, and
("it; vit) is independent of (vi1; : : : ; vi;t 1; vi;t+1; : : : ; viT ). If E("it j vit) is linear, then:
E("it j zi; ci; si) = E(vit j zi; ci; si) = E(vit j zi; sit): (7)
Under the previous assumptions, we can write the primary equation (4) as:
yit = xit + ci + E(vit j zi; sit) + eit; (8)
where eit is an idiosyncratic error term verifying E(eit j zi; ci; si) = 0 by construction.
As noted above, the FE-2SLS yields a consistent estimation of the parameters of in-
terest if the expectation given by (7) is 0. Then, an immediate test for sample selection
bias is obtained by testingH0 :  = 0 in (8), which can be estimated by FE-2SLS. For the
9Related papers are Gonzalez-Chapela (2004), Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2000) and Kyriazi-
dou (1997).
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selected sample (that is, sit = 1) we only need E(vit j zi; sit = 1); which can be obtained
from the usual probit estimation:
E(vit j zi; sit = 1) = ( + zit + zi); (9)
where (:) denotes the inverse Mill's ratio. Let bit denote a consistent estimate. To test
for selection one simply has to estimate P (sit = 1 j zi) = ( + zit + zi) with a
reduced-form probit at each period t, to plug bit into the primary equation, to estimate
the augmented primary equation by FE-2SLS and to test forH0 :  = 0 with a t-statistic.
To add more exibility to the model, it is possible to interact bit with time dummies to
allow the coefcient  to be different across t. In this case, a Wald statistic is used to
test the joint signicance of the T coefcients t. In our empirical specication, we use a
FE-GMM estimator instead of the FE-2SLS and allow for different t.
SW offer a correction procedure for the sample selection problem when the null is
rejected. It amounts to estimating equation (8) by Pooled 2SLS using a decomposition of
the household-specic effect ci that follows Mundlak (1978). Under the previous assump-
tions about the selection rule and the unobserved effects, the primary equation of interest
(4) can be rewritten as:
yit = + xit + zi + tE(vit j zi; sit) + eit: (10)
SW show that applying the Pooled 2SLS estimator to (10) after replacing E(vit j zi; sit)
by the estimated inverse Mill's ratio bit yields a consistent estimator of the parameters.
We adapt the procedure presented in SW to system estimation and propose a more
efcient GMM estimator (Pooled GMM hereafter). Its derivation and the computation of
the asymptotic variance estimator that accounts for the effect of using estimated rather
than actual values for it are collected in Appendix A.
Now, we address the question of the endogeneity of the regressors and the choice of
the instruments. It is likely that hourly earnings and household non-labor income are
not independent of hours worked. Therefore, we have chosen to instrument the woman's
wage rate, the man's wage rate and the household non-labor income. One might also ar-
gue that the effect of marriage on labor supply can not be distinguished from the effect
of pre-school children on parental time use. Indeed, the presence of children is more fre-
quent among married couples in comparison with cohabitants who may enter marriage to
begin childbearing or to legitimate the birth of a child. Child dependency on their moth-
ers (breastfeeding for example) coupled with the virtual absence of child-care facilities
in West Germany for small children10 create a strong incentive for specialization in con-
junction with motherhood. To limit the extent of this problem, we focus on observations
with no children under two. We account for this potential endogenous selection rule in
our estimation procedure but assume that older children can be regarded as strictly ex-
ogenous after conditioning on the unobserved effect. This approach is commonly used in
the literature (for instance Lundberg and Rose, 2002). Moreover, given that we ignore the
issue of union formation and dissolution, we also consider the duration of the relationship
to be strictly exogenous once we condition on the unobserved effect. Marital status will
be either exogenous or endogenous depending on the estimations.
The set of excluded instruments that do not appear in the labor supply equations con-
sists of the following variables: male and female years of schooling and their squares,
10In West Germany full-day child-care is rare (Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 2002). Approximately 5 percent
of children under age three are enrolled in formal child-care. Among three-ve years old, 74:6 percent are
enrolled in kindergarten (Gornick and Meyers, 2003).
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male and female age and their squares, product of partners' age and education, and time
dummies. Our intuition is that these variables have an impact on the various sources of the
household income.11 Therefore, there are 26 excluded instruments from the labor supply
equations.
Finally, it is important to have at least one instrument that affects only the selection
equation, otherwise the parameters of the primary equation are identied through the
nonlinearity in the inverse Mill's ratios. We use the female and male unemployment rates
as exclusive regressors for the probit model.
5 The data
Our data is drawn from the rst 21 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
for the years 1984-2004. We extract a sample of observations that correspond to couples
living in the former Federal Republic of Germany who are between 25 and 55 years old,
who have nished their education and are available for the labor market. Households
where adults are retired or students are excluded. We also exclude households where
adults are self-employed. Excluded from the sample are also couples who gave incom-
plete or incoherent information. Finally, when an individual appears in more than one
couple, we select the one with the longest duration in the data. Therefore, to each indi-
vidual corresponds only one household. In all, these selection criteria lead to a sample of
4,762 couples resulting in 28,167 observations. On average, a couple appears six times
over the 21 years period (the minimum and maximum are 2 and 21, respectively). Of the
4,762 couples in our sample, 3,796 (79:71 percent) are always married, 364 (7:64 per-
cent) always cohabiting and 602 (12:65 percent) make the transition from a cohabiting to
a married couple. The couples who always live in a consensual union are observed for a
shorter number of periods. Their average number of waves is four within our observation
window.
Also, to estimate the labor supply systems (1), (2) and (4) conditional on xed effects,
we need at least two observations for the same couple. Therefore, the data we use for
estimating these equations uses all couples without children under two who report, for
both partners, a strictly positive amount of domestic work and market work in at least two
periods. This leaves us with 12,925 observations from 2,762 households.
Measuring time use
Time spent on non-market work is computed as the sum of hours spent on housework
(washing, cooking and cleaning), childcare, gardening and repairs in a typical weekday.
Not all domestic work time is covered by this variable as weekend non-market work is
not included.12 However, we probably account for a larger set of activities than that used
when the question is only about time spent on housework (and not about childcare) in a
normal week.
We measure time spent in market work as the annual work hours on all jobs divided
by 365 (and by 366 for leap years). It corresponds to an average number of hours worked
per day. It means that market work and non-market work have the same unit of time.
Measuring earnings
Total labor earnings include wages and salaries from all jobs including overtime and
secondary jobs. The wage rate is the average hourly earnings dened by dividing total
labor income over annual hours of work on all jobs. Non-labor income includes income
11These are standard instruments in the literature. See for instance Chiappori et al. (2002) among others.
12Complete information on weekend domestic work is asked only with years 93, 95, 97, 99, 01 and 03.
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from assets, rent, private transfers, public transfers, etc. All these income variables are
in euros adjusted for ination with the price index provided by the GSOEP. Non-labor
income is in thousands of euros.
Measuring marital status
The couple's marital status is represented by the dummy variableMarried that takes
on a value of 1 if the partners are legally married at the time of the interview, and 0 if they
are cohabiting.13
Measuring duration of conjugal life
Duration of conjugal life can be computed from a retrospective data le on marital
history that contains yearly information on marital status. The data include the beginning
and the ending of each marital status spell.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Whole Sample
Total Marital status
AM CM AC
Age (f) 38:70 39:69 33:88 35:91
(7:58) (7:39) (6:43) (7:85)
Age (m) 41:21 42:33 35:98 37:35
(7:77) (7:53) (6:53) (7:74)
Market work participation (f) 0:66 0:62 0:80 0:88
(0:47) (0:48) (0:40) (0:33)
Market work participation (m) 0:95 0:95 0:96 0:92
(0:22) (0:22) (0:20) (0:27)
Non-market work participation (f) 0:99 0:99 0:99 0:98
(0:08) (0:07) (0:11) (0:14)
Non-market work participation (m) 0:87 0:87 0:90 0:85
(0:34) (0:34) (0:30) (0:35)
Number of children (f) 1:37 1:54 0:72 0:44
(1:16) (1:15) (0:91) (0:77)
Education level (f) 10:99 10:74 12:04 12:27
(2:41) (2:33) (2:35) (2:67)
Education level (m) 11:44 11:27 12:26 12:00
(2:56) (2:51) (2:68) (2:61)
Duration of conjugal life 16:98 18:96 10:26 7:44
(9:03) (8:61) (5:63) (5:79)
Number of observations 28; 167 22; 882 3; 891 1; 394
Notes: Sample standard deviations are in parentheses below sample means. AM refers to couples that
are always married, CM to couples that transit from consensual union to marriage and AC to couples
that are always cohabiting. The duration of conjugal life is the maximum duration observed per couple. Its
average is computed over the 4,762 couples, not over the 28,167 observations.
Summary statistics for the whole sample that includes nonparticipation in the labor
market and in the house are given in Table 1. Sample characteristics are classied by
marital status. The average age for men is 41 years and 39 years for women. From the
28,167 observations, 34 percent are women that do not participate in the labor market
and 13 percent are men that do not work in the house. Of the 4,762 females (males) in
our sample, 47:84 (88:70) percent always participate in the labor market and 18:5 (1:83)
13The distinction between legal marriage and cohabitation is made in the original data le, not in the
GSOEP cross-national equivalent le that is often used by researchers.
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percent never. Only 1:81 percent of the men never work in the house.14
Women who live in a consensual union participate more in the labor market than
married women. On average, cohabiting couples are younger, have fewer children and are
shorter lived than married couples. These ndings could illustrate the transitional status
of cohabitation but could also result from the composition of our sample. Cohabitation is
indeed increasing over time.15 The variables related to consensual unions are thus more
likely to suffer from right censoring.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for two-earner households without young children where
both partners do some housework
Total Number of children Marital status
0 1 2 3 AM CM AC
Age (f) 39.15 37.02 40.19 40.13 40.53 40.52 34.27 35.53
(7.39) (8.84) (6.97) (5.75) (5.38) (6.96) (6.62) (7.66)
Age (m) 41.70 39.27 42.69 42.87 43.87 43.24 36.45 37.16
(7.56) (8.76) (7.16) (6.01) (5.75) (7.04) (6.79) (7.40)
Domestic hours (hf ) 5.21 2.67 5.91 6.84 7.24 5.57 4.44 2.91
(3.41) (1.63) (3.16) (3.50) (3.28) (3.31) (3.73) (2.46)
Domestic hours (hm) 2.69 2.02 2.94 3.07 3.21 2.77 2.58 2.08
(1.85) (1.24) (1.99) (1.96) (2.17) (1.87) (1.81) (1.52)
Domestic hours 2.45 1.61 2.69 2.99 3.13 2.61 2.07 1.63
ratio (rh = hf
hm
) (2.06) (1.19) (2.11) (2.34) (2.41) (2.08) (2.06) (1.39)
Market hours (lf ) 4.31 5.29 4.03 3.66 3.62 4.15 4.73 5.22
(1.65) (1.28) (1.56) (1.59) (1.61) (1.63) (1.63) (1.44)
Market hours (lm) 5.93 5.95 5.92 5.93 5.93 5.93 5.94 5.98
(1.11) (1.13) (1.08) (1.13) (1.13) (1.08) (1.19) (1.28)
Market hours 0.77 0.94 0.72 0.66 0.65 0.74 0.85 0.93
ratio (rl = lf
lm
) (0.42) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) (0.37) (0.40) (0.45) (0.44)
Wage rate (wf ) 11.27 12.13 11.22 10.54 10.55 11.06 11.91 12.16
(4.55) (4.35) (4.57) (4.59) (4.61) (4.57) (4.38) (4.52)
Wage rate (wm) 15.01 14.84 15.02 15.31 14.71 15.11 14.73 14.61
(4.78) (4.79) (4.81) (4.74) (4.72) (4.76) (4.74) (5.11)
Relative 0.81 0.88 0.80 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.88 0.90
wage rate ( wf
wm
) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.46) (0.44)
Share of 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.50
total work (f) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Share of 0.64 0.56 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.59 0.55
domestic work (f) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
Share of 0.41 0.47 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.46
market work (f) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09)
Number of 12,925 4,325 3,821 3,642 1,137 9,914 2,184 827
observations
Notes: Sample standard deviations are in parentheses below sample means. AM refers to couples that are
always married, CM to couples that transit from consensual union to marriage and AC to couples that
are always cohabiting.
14These percentages are computed over the corresponding 28,167 observations.
15About 4:32 (9:19) percent of the households in our sample live in a consensual union in 1984 (2004).
The highest proportion is observed for 1995 with 12:32 percent of cohabiting couples.
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Table 2 reports statistics on the sample of households with no children under two and
with both partners working in the labor market and in the house. The reported sample
characteristics are classied by the number of children in the household and by marital
status. On average, women work more hours in the house than men but less in the labor
market. The variability of hours is lower for men: from the 12; 925 observations, 77 (38)
percent are men (women) that work at most three hours in the house per day and 75 (46)
percent are men (women) that work between 35 and 45 hours per week in paid jobs.
The domestic workload increases with the number of children. Also, married women
work more in the house than cohabiting women and less in the labor market. In all, the
female share of total work (total work is market work together with domestic work)
is slightly greater than 50 percent for married women and for couples with children. It
seems that men do not fully compensate for the fewer hours of domestic work by working
more in the market when they have children. Finally, women have a lower average wage
rate than men.
6 Results
6.1 The effects of marriage on the domestic work and market work
hours (log) ratios
Conditioning the sample on households with working partners (that is, hf > 0; lf > 0;
hm > 0 and lm > 0) and no children under two years of age may induce a selectivity
bias. To account for all these selection rules we estimate 21 reduced-form participation
equations and include the 21 inverse Mill's ratios into the market and non-market work
equations. The results show a signicant effect of the unemployment rates.16 Hence the
parameters of the domestic work and the market work equations, which exclude the latter
variables, are non-parametrically identied.
The estimates of the base model (1) with exogenous marriage and using the xed
effect estimator FE-GMM are shown in Table 3. We report a Wald statistic to test the
overall signicance of the 21 inverse Mill's ratios added to test for selection bias.
At the ve percent level, there is statistically signicant evidence of selection bias for
the log ratio of domestic hours but not for the log ratio of market hours. These results seem
contradictory as our selection rule affects mainly couples with women that do not work
in the labor market. Consequently, we decide to correct for contemporaneous selection in
the equation related to domestic work but also in the equation related to market work.17
For this purpose, we use the Pooled GMM estimator that models the unobserved effect as
a linear combination of the time averages of the exogenous variables. In comparison with
the preceding estimation, we add eight time-constant regressors to explain the log ratios.
Their effect could not be identied with the FE-GMM estimator.
The results are shown in Table 4. We present two Wald statistics to test the joint
signicance of the 13 coefcients related to the time averages of the exogenous variables
and to test the joint signicance of the 21 inverse Mill's ratios.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 report the estimates when marriage is assumed to be ex-
ogenous. At the ve percent level, the time averages used to model the unobserved effect
are jointly signicant for both equations. Like the estimates obtained with the FE-GMM
16To save space the 21 probits are not reported. Results are available upon request.
17We also estimate the model that accounts for selection bias only for the female relative domestic work-
load. The estimates are very similar.
13
Table 3: The effects of married life on the female-to-male domestic and market work
hours (log) ratios - FE-GMM estimates (Base specication, Model 1)
rh = h
f
hm
rl = l
f
lm
Married 0.112 -0.084
(0.055) (0.032)
Log wage ratio -1.74 1.008
(0.432) (0.291)
Non-labor income -0.002 -0.000
(0.009) (0.006)
Dur2a 0.019 -0.072
(0.039) (0.025)
Dur3 0.03 -0.087
(0.06) (0.039)
Dur4 0.048 -0.116
(0.07) (0.045)
Dur5 0.079 -0.106
(0.078) (0.05)
Children under 5 0.102 -0.223
(0.064) (0.044)
Children 5+ 0.069 -0.079
(0.029) (0.019)
Wald test bit 35.337 9.46
P-value 0.026 0.985
Sargan test 31:896
P-Value 0:964
aSee footnote 6
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefcients in bold are signicant at the ve percent level.
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Table 4: The effects of married life on the female-to-male domestic and market work
hours (log) ratios - Pooled GMM estimates (Base specication, Model 1)
Marriage is exogenous Marriage is endogenous
rh = h
f
hm
rl = l
f
lm
rh = h
f
hm
rl = l
f
lm
Married 0.153 -0.099 0.375 -0.436
(0.049) (0.030) (0.184) (0.115)
Log Wage ratio -1.034 0.726 -1.067 0.632
(0.342) (0.220) (0.38) (0.239)
Non-labor income -0.020 0.006 -0.034 0.012
(0.010) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007)
Dur2 -0.002 -0.066
(0.033) (0.020)
Dur3 0.012 -0.078
(0.045) (0.029)
Dur4 0.006 -0.098
(0.059) (0.038)
Dur5 -0.035 -0.064
(0.068) (0.043)
Children under 5 0.276 -0.280 0.287 -0.299
(0.049) (0.033) (0.053) (0.034)
Children 5+ 0.129 -0.096 0.135 -0.108
(0.024) (0.015) (0.027) (0.016)
Middle regions 0.072 0.009 0.080 -0.004
(0.032) (0.022) (0.035) (0.023)
Southern regions 0.087 0.002 0.097 -0.003
(0.025) (0.017) (0.027) (0.017)
German00 0.113 0.026 0.111 0.067
(0.089) (0.069) (0.097) (0.072)
German10 -0.010 -0.037 0.006 -0.042
(0.050) (0.040) (0.055) (0.044)
German01 0.123 -0.116 0.139 -0.111
(0.058) (0.047) (0.061) (0.047)
Cohort 1931-45 0.159 -0.018 0.108 0.009
(0.064) (0.044) (0.062) (0.042)
Cohort 1946-55 0.089 0.003 0.073 0.013
(0.036) (0.024) (0.037) (0.024)
Cohort 1966-79 -0.108 0.012 -0.076 -0.014
(0.039) (0.024) (0.043) (0.026)
Intercept 0.473 0.502 0.323 0.584
(0.370) (0.253) (0.411) (0.264)
Wald test bit 34.624 24.857 36.598 29.598
P-value 0.031 0.253 0.019 0.100
Wald test zit 49.336 49.103 33.976 29.618
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003
Sargan test 44:098 52:413
P-Value 0:633 0:381
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefcients in bold are signicant at the ve percent level.
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estimator, there is only evidence of sample selection for the log ratio of domestic hours.
Also, the Sargan test does not reject the validity of the instruments and the overidentifying
restrictions. We now turn to the parameters of main interest.
The results indicate that marriage has a signicant effect on both domestic and mar-
ket work. When women are married, their domestic workload increases relative to men
whereas the ratio of female-to-male market hours falls. All else being equal, married
women are more likely to specialize in domestic work than cohabiting women.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 report the estimates when married life is instrumented.
The duration of the relationship is used as a supplementary excluded instrument.18 The
effects of marriage on the ratios of domestic work hours and market work hours are still
signicant when it is instrumented. However, the estimated coefcients of marriage ex-
hibit a severe change in magnitude. It is possible that the effects of married life are
seriously underestimated when marriage is supposed exogenous. On the other hand, such
large variations in the estimated coefcients of marriage can denote a problem of weak
instruments.19 In such a case, and with no other relevant instruments for marriage, it may
be better to just assume its exogeneity. Nevertheless, being married still raises the female
relative domestic workload and decreases the female relative market workload, just as
before.
The effects of the other explanatory variables are in line with those reported when
marriage is supposed to be exogenous. Relative earnings have a negative effect on the
ratio of non-market hours. A one percent rise in relative earnings leads roughly to a one
percent decrease in the ratio of non-market hours. Women with a high relative wage are
less likely to specialize in domestic activities. On the contrary, relative earnings have a
positive impact on the log ratio of market hours. The division of market work between
partners is more equal for high female relative wages. Also, non-labor income has a
signicant and negative impact on the log ratio of unpaid hours. It could be that wealthy
couples buy more market substitutes for home-based activities.
The presence of children in the household, especially of young children, raises women's
domestic workload relative to men and decreases their share of market work. This is in
accordance with the negative correlation between children and female market labor sup-
ply usually observed in empirical studies. Moreover, some regional disparities explain
the division of domestic work between men and women. The female relative domestic
workload is higher for households living in the southern states of West Germany. The
ratio of female-to-male domestic hours is also higher for German born women living with
a non-German partner. Also, the results exhibit a cohort effect. Younger women are less
likely to specialize in unpaid work than their elders.
6.2 The effects of marriage on domestic work andmarket work hours
In this section the two alternative specications of section 3.2 are considered. Two sup-
plementary explanatory variables are female age in the equations related to women and
male age in the equations related to men.
18If we allow the duration of the relationship to appear in the labor supply equations, the estimates
for Married become very imprecise. We therefore maintain this exclusion restriction. Also, we test for
the endogeneity of the duration of conjugal life whether marital status is assumed to be exogenous or
endogenous. In both cases we do not reject the null (that is, the exogeneity of the duration of conjugal life).
19We estimate the model with other instruments such as the female-to-male age and education ratios.
It does not change the estimates. Also, as mentioned in Browning (1992), the usual practice of treating
dummies as unbounded and continuous in the auxiliary equation may cause problems. Wemay be predicting
values outside the (zero, one) interval that may in turn affect the estimates of the parameter of interest.
16
6.2.1 The effects of marriage on women's domestic and market work hours
To save space, only the Pooled GMM estimates of the alternative model (2) are shown.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 report the results when marriage is assumed to be exogenous.
On the whole, the results are in accordance with those obtained for the base model. Also,
there is evidence of selection in both domestic hours and market hours. Marriage has a
positive effect on the female number of domestic hours and a negative effect on the female
number of market hours. Interestingly, the former effect offsets the latter so that pure
leisure falls for married women, especially for couples with pre-school children.
The results show a strong effect of pre-school children and a signicant effect of the
duration of conjugal life on women's time use. Women that have been living with a partner
for a certain period of time spend more hours on home-based activities and fewer hours
on market activities than the others. Clearly, role specialization tends to increase with
time. This is consistent with Becker's notion of increasing relationship-specic capital.
Own wage elasticities of market work and domestic work are shown in Table 6. These
are not intertemporal elasticities as we do not account for intertemporal budgeting in our
model. However, the amplitude of the market work elasticities is in line with that found
in other studies using German data. For example, Laisney et al. (1993) report median
intertemporal wage elasticities that range from 0:46 to 0:60 depending on the estimation.
The wage elasticity is 0:40 for West German couples in Steiner and Jacobebbinghaus
(2003). A similar pattern is found in Davies et al. (2000).
Finally, columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 report the estimates when married life is instru-
mented. The estimates of the effect of marriage are very different to those in columns 1
and 2. Marriage now increases by 7:23 the number of hours per day that women spend
in home-based activities, which is greatly overestimated. It is very likely that this vari-
able suffers from weak instruments. Moreover, none of the wage and non-female income
parameters are signicant. However, the qualitative impact of marriage on female labor
supplies remains the same. Pure leisure decreases for married women. We now turn to
the estimates of the second alternative specication.
6.2.2 The effects of marriage on female and male domestic and market work hours
Table 7 reports the estimates of the alternative model (4) when marriage is assumed to be
exogenous. We note that the parameters of the male equations have large standard errors.
This lack of precision is explained by the little variation in the male allocation of time.
Most of the parameter estimates of the female equations are in line with those in Table
5. The overall qualitative results remain the same. In particular, married life increases
women's number of domestic hours and decreases their number of market hours such that
the total effect is a fall in women's pure leisure.
Own and cross wage elasticities are shown in Table 8. Women exhibit a wage elasticity
of domestic work lower than that of Table 6. Their cross wage elasticity of domestic work
is signicant and positive. Again, domestic work is more elastic than market work for
women. On the contrary, men's domestic labor supply is inelastic.
Once again, the instrumentation of marriage leads to a huge variation in the estimated
effects of this variable but the qualitative impact of marriage on women's allocation of
time is the same (see Table 10, in Appendix B). Married women spend more time on
domestic work and fewer hours on market work. Also, it seems that marriage now has a
signicant and positive effect on male domestic work whereas its impact on male market
work is not signicant anymore.
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Table 5: The effects of married life on female domestic and market work hours - Pooled
GMM estimates (Alternative specication, Model 2)
Marriage is exogenous Marriage is endogenous
hf lf hf lf
Married 0.723 -0.271 7.229 -2.242
(0.207) (0.099) (0.73) (0.343)
Log female wage -4.477 1.629 -0.796 0.559
(1.917) (0.893) (1.891) (0.853)
Female non-labor income 10 3 0.098 -0.021 0.024 0.000
(0.024) (0.011) (0.026) (0.000)
Dur2 0.763 -0.277
(0.144) (0.066)
Dur3 1.632 -0.554
(0.215) (0.096)
Dur4 1.316 -0.589
(0.268) (0.123)
Dur5 0.442 -0.462
(0.359) (0.168)
Children under 5 2.842 -0.898 2.699 -0.865
(0.218) (0.095) (0.226) (0.099)
Children 5+ 0.933 -0.344 1.103 -0.399
(0.105) (0.046) (0.103) (0.045)
Age 10 2 -0.109 -0.012 -0.224 0.009
(0.032) (0.015) (0.035) (0.015)
Middle regions 0.230 0.004 0.506 -0.082
(0.128) (0.068) (0.144) (0.075)
Southern regions 0.269 0.001 0.363 -0.021
(0.11) (0.052) (0.118) (0.059)
German00 -0.393 0.442 -1.262 0.663
(0.413) (0.194) (0.458) (0.215)
German10 -0.399 0.005 -0.227 -0.032
(0.266) (0.125) (0.318) (0.152)
German01 0.169 -0.166 -0.067 -0.109
(0.278) (0.122) (0.316) (0.132)
Cohort 1931-45 1.263 -0.199 1.072 -0.219
(0.294) (0.156) (0.295) (0.169)
Cohort 1946-55 0.435 0.030 0.346 0.025
(0.169) (0.082) (0.172) (0.090)
Cohort 1966-79 -0.396 0.101 -0.078 0.038
(0.171) (0.076) (0.208) (0.090)
Intercept 12.172 3.827 3.845 6.333
(4.145) (2.000) (4.258) (1.974)
Wald test bit 90.281 45.355 122.552 64.247
P-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Wald test zit 120.53 60.326 108.813 16.868
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.155
Sargan test 53:198 66:316
P-Value 0:217 0:041
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefcients in bold are signicant at the ve percent level.
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Table 6: Female wage elasticities of labor supply
Estimates Asymptotic Std. Err. P-Values
Estimated wage elasticity of the female domestic labor supply
 1:119 0:479 0:019
Estimated wage elasticity of the female market labor supply
0:343 0:188 0:068
Notes: Elasticities are computed at the median. Marriage is assumed to be exogenous.
6.3 Robustness Checks
6.3.1 Estimates on alternative samples
As previously mentioned, it could be difcult to disentangle the observed effect of mar-
riage on labor supply from the effect of children. To give more robustness to our results,
we re-estimate the base model on the sample of couples with no children under ve and
on the sample of couples with no children under eleven. This leaves us with 11; 727 ob-
servations from 2; 579 households if we include all observations with no children under
ve or with 8; 657 observations from 2; 041 couples if we include all observations with no
children under eleven.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 are the estimates of the base model (1) with no children
under ve. Columns (3) and (4) are the estimates with no children under eleven. Marriage
is assumed to be exogenous. On the whole, the coefcients of the sample with no children
under eleven are less precisely estimated.
The marital status coefcients exhibit a substantial fall in magnitude when we move
from couples with pre-school children to couples with no children under eleven. It sug-
gests that the effect of marriage on the parental allocation of time is higher for couples
with young children. It is also possible that the marital status coefcients capture part of
the effect of children on time use as married couples tend to have more children. How-
ever this may be, the effect of marriage is signicant and has the expected sign. Married
life increases women's specialization in home-based activities. This effect remains when
marriage is instrumented; though with a large variation in the point estimates (see Table
11, in Appendix B).
For couples with no children under ve, relative earnings still have a signicant and
negative effect - though smaller in magnitude - on the ratio of non-market hours and a
signicant and positive impact on the ratio of market hours. The effect of relative earnings
is insignicant for couples with no children under eleven. Also, whatever the children's
age, non-labor income continues to have a signicant and negative impact on the log ratio
of domestic hours.
6.3.2 Does marriage cause this outcome?
The observed effects of marriage may be due to selectivity if married couples exhibit sys-
tematic different characteristics than cohabitants. To check this assumption we estimate
the base model (1) with a different marital status variable (Change hereafter) that takes
on the value one for observations that correspond to married couples previously cohabit-
ing. It is zero for couples that are either cohabiting or always married. This variable is for
the permanent effect of the transition from cohabitation to marriage on time use. It does
not capture intrinsic differences between married couples and cohabitants. Interestingly,
its effect on domestic and market work hours is signicant and very similar to those in
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Table 7: The effects of marriage on female and male domestic and market work hours -
Pooled GMM estimates, marriage is exogenous (Alternative specication, Model 4)
No children under two
hf lf hm lm
Married 0.631 -0.262 0.116 0.156
(0.204) (0.098) (0.125) (0.087)
Log female wage -3.535 1.368 -1.645 -0.662
(1.949) (0.942) (1.233) (0.801)
Log male wage 4.431 -0.960 -0.098 1.882
(1.296) (0.623) (0.823) (0.543)
Non-labor income 0.018 0.006 0.071 -0.021
(0.042) (0.019) (0.034) (0.018)
Dur2 0.695 -0.261 0.443 -0.034
(0.131) (0.066) (0.087) (0.063)
Dur3 1.400 -0.503 0.719 -0.249
(0.214) (0.105) (0.131) (0.093)
Dur4 1.137 -0.535 0.528 -0.136
(0.266) (0.137) (0.164) (0.117)
Dur5 0.266 -0.411 0.221 -0.125
(0.336) (0.175) (0.214) (0.149)
Children under 5 2.966 -0.938 0.981 0.068
(0.214) (0.098) (0.139) (0.084)
Children 5+ 1.009 -0.370 0.175 -0.000
(0.106) (0.05) (0.068) (0.042)
Middle regions 0.242 -0.012 -0.101 -0.026
(0.129) (0.069) (0.080) (0.054)
Southern regions 0.239 0.007 -0.081 -0.028
(0.105) (0.052) (0.065) (0.043)
German00 -0.263 0.428 -0.089 0.385
(0.433) (0.208) (0.281) (0.168)
German10 -0.276 -0.026 -0.174 0.199
(0.255) (0.126) (0.167) (0.091)
German01 0.285 -0.196 -0.042 0.276
(0.286) (0.131) (0.185) (0.116)
Cohort 1931-45 1.111 -0.148 0.180 -0.098
(0.281) (0.154) (0.174) (0.118)
Cohort 1946-55 0.391 0.035 0.017 0.031
(0.159) (0.081) (0.101) (0.062)
Cohort 1966-79 -0.351 0.085 -0.102 0.066
(0.163) (0.074) (0.102) (0.068)
Age 10 2 -0.139 -0.007 -0.031 -0.023
(0.030) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012)
Intercept 0.891 6.261 6.568 2.049
(3.916) (1.958) (2.499) (1.703)
Wald test bit 101.364 41.591 128.051 42.965
P-value 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.003
Wald test zit 136.553 62.038 56.806 32.776
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Sargan test 102:681
P-Value 0:136
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefcients in bold are signicant at the ve percent level.
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Table 8: Female and male wage elasticities of labor supply
Estimates Asymptotic Std. Err. P-Values
Estimated wage elasticity of the female domestic labor supply
 :884 0:487 0:069
Estimated cross wage elasticity of the female domestic labor supply
1:108 0:324 0:001
Estimated wage elasticity of the female market labor supply
0:288 0:198 0:147
Estimated cross wage elasticity of the female market labor supply
 :202 0:131 0:124
Estimated wage elasticity of the male domestic labor supply
 :049 0:411 0:905
Estimated cross wage elasticity of the male domestic labor supply
 :823 0:617 0:182
Estimated wage elasticity of the male market labor supply
0:331 0:096 0:001
Estimated cross wage elasticity of the male market labor supply
 0:116 0:141 0:408
Notes: Elasticities are computed at the median. Marriage is assumed to be exogenous.
Tables 4 and 9. For couples with no children under two for instance, the transition from
cohabitation to married life, when assumed to be exogenous, increases the log ratio of do-
mestic work hours by 0:150 and decreases the log ratio of market work hours by  0:099.
We interpret this result as evidence of no signicant selection into marriage. Table 12 in
Appendix C reports the results.
6.3.3 Testing exclusion restrictions
We now consider whether education, age and unemployment rates (which only appear in
the selection equation) provide valid exclusion restrictions. Including these variables in
the log ratios equations does not have signicant effects on the original parameters esti-
mates and their coefcients are insignicant. The effect of the duration of conjugal life
on the log ratio of market work remains when age is a regressor. The t-values for the co-
efcients of the female education (age) are below 1:40 (1:33) whereas the t-values for the
male education (age) are below 1:17 (1:33). We hence maintain these exclusion restric-
tions. We also test for interaction terms between marital status and wages and between
marital status and the duration of conjugal life. Whatever the sample used, none of them
is signicant.20 Similar conclusions are drawn for the two alternative specications (2)
and (4) of section 3.2.21
20These gures and conclusions concern the estimation with marriage being exogenous. They still hold
with endogenous marriage.
21Results are available upon request.
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Table 9: Alternative samples: the effects of married life on the female-to-male domestic
and market work hours (log) ratios - Pooled GMM estimates, marriage is exogenous (Base
specication, Model 1)
No children under ve No children under eleven
rh = h
f
hm
rl = l
f
lm
rh = h
f
hm
rl = l
f
lm
Married 0.126 -0.099 0.094 -0.078
(0.049) (0.032) (0.047) (0.024)
Log wage ratio -0.893 0.757 -0.090 -0.125
(0.341) (0.227) (0.318) (0.198)
Non-labor income -0.019 0.010 -0.025 0.000
(0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008)
Dur2 -0.016 -0.057 -0.071 -0.005
(0.034) (0.022) (0.036) (0.02)
Dur3 0.039 -0.079 -0.041 -0.013
(0.046) (0.032) (0.046) (0.029)
Dur4 0.012 -0.080 0.102 -0.158
(0.059) (0.041) (0.058) (0.04)
Dur5 -0.021 -0.051 0.084 -0.160
(0.070) (0.047) (0.072) (0.049)
Children 5+ 0.140 -0.099 0.099 -0.065
(0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.013)
Middle regions 0.087 -0.002 0.103 -0.019
(0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (0.026)
Southern regions 0.107 -0.004 0.105 0.013
(0.025) (0.018) (0.026) (0.02)
German00 0.122 -0.010 -0.061 0.157
(0.093) (0.074) (0.092) (0.087)
German10 0.024 -0.053 -0.000 0.004
(0.048) (0.042) (0.053) (0.062)
German01 0.110 -0.128 0.017 -0.081
(0.059) (0.050) (0.059) (0.051)
Cohort 1931-45 0.126 -0.023 0.007 0.01
(0.064) (0.045) (0.066) (0.052)
Cohort 1946-55 0.076 -0.002 0.003 0.023
(0.035) (0.026) (0.038) (0.03)
Cohort 1966-79 -0.098 0.004 -0.143 0.022
(0.041) (0.027) (0.046) (0.027)
Intercept 0.629 0.343 0.995 -0.063
(0.366) (0.264) (0.382) (0.274)
Wald test bit 32.629 28.658 19.158 34.855
P-value 0.050 0.122 0.575 0.029
Wald test zit 29.214 29.168 29.643 27.188
P-value 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004
Sargan test 41:692 52:643
P-Value 0:728 0:299
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefcients in bold are signicant at the ve percent level.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated the effects of the transition from cohabitation to marriage
on household market and non-market labor supply using a German sample of working
couples. Our results indicate that marriage raises women's specialization in domestic
work with a greater impact on couples with preschool children. We nd that specialization
in unpaid work is less likely for women with a high market wage.
These ndings are robust across three different specications. Actually, marriage in-
creases women's specialization in home-based activities whether we consider the female-
to-male domestic and market work hours (log) ratios or women's market and non-market
labor supply or men's and women's market and non-market labor supply.
Interestingly, we nd that married women enjoy less leisure than cohabiting women.
Marriage decreases women's market work and increases their domestic work so that the
overall effect is a fall in their leisure. We also found evidence that married men enjoy less
leisure than cohabiting men but the effect of marriage on men's labor supply is less clear
cut due to little variation in the male allocation of time.
Finally, the magnitude of the estimated coefcients of marriage changes drastically
when marital status is assumed to be endogenous but the qualitative results remain the
same. Marriage still increases women's specialization in unpaid work. It could also
be that marriage inuences the decision to participate in the labor market. In this case,
the idea would be to estimate structural participation equations with marital status as an
explanatory variable. This is a topic of future work.
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A The GMM Estimator
Here we derive the GMM estimator and its variance for a general model that controls
for unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection bias. We begin with some nota-
tion. For couple i at period t we have a joint observation on (Yit; Xit), where Yit =0B@ Y1it . . .
YGit
1CA and Xit =
0B@ X1it . . .
XGit
1CA are bloc-diagonal matrices that
stand for theG regressands Y 1it ; : : : ; Y Git , and theG vectors of regressorsX1it; : : : ; XGit , res-
pectively.
The second-step system has the form:
Yit = Xit + eit = bXit + (Xit   bXit) + eit; (11)
where bXit is the bloc-diagonal matrix of regressors including the generated inverse Mill's
ratios from the rst-step probit estimation,  = (01; : : : ; 
0
G)
0 is the vector of interest, and
eit is a G-vector of disturbance terms.
Let bZit denoted the vector of instruments that include the generated inverse Mill's
ratios, and t the vector of unknown coefcients of the rst-step probit equation. For the
Fixed Effect model, we have Yit = yit   yi, bXit = (xit   xi; bit   bi) and bZit = bzit   bzi
whereas Yit = yit, bXgit = (g; xgit; zi; bit) and bZit = bzit for the Pooled model.
The GMM estimator of (11) on the selected sample is then given by:b = C 0W 1C 1C 0W 1E; (12)
where C is a bloc-diagonal matrix with Cg = N 1
NP
i=1
TP
t=1
sit bX 0git bZit on the diagonal, E is
a stacked vector of elements N 1
NP
i=1
TP
t=1
sit bZ 0itygit, andW is a bloc-diagonal matrix with
N 1
NP
i=1
TP
t=1
sit bZ 0it bZit on the diagonal, for g = 1; :::; G.
We now turn to the asymptotic variance estimator of b. Plugging equation (11) in (12)
we can write: p
N(b   ) = C 0W 1C 1C 0W 1A;
whereA =

N 1=2
NP
i=1
TP
t=1
sit bZ 0Git hXit   bXit  + eiti ;with bZ 0Git an appropriate stack
of bZ 0it to have compatible dimensions.22
The term

Xit   bXit  in A can be approximated to rst order around  = b, the
estimates of the probit equation, by the following expression:bXit = Xit + 0rX 0it(bG   G) + op(1);
where rX 0it is the Jacobian of X 0it with respect to . Again, the vector bG   G is just
a stack of b    to have compatible dimensions. Following Semykina and Wooldridge
(2005), we write:
p
N(b   ) = N 1=2 NX
i=1
ri() + op(1);
22For instance, bZ 02it = ( bZit; bZit)0 for a two-equation system.
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where ri() is a term that depends on the expected hessian and scores of the probit log-
likelihood.
Using some algebra it follows that:
A ' N 1=2
NX
i=1
"
TX
t=1
sit bZ 0Giteit   F NX
i=1
ri()
#
; (13)
where F =
0B@ F1...
FG
1CA ; with Fg = 1N NP
i=1
TP
t=1
sit bZ 0it0grX 0git, g = 1; :::; G. The asymptotic
variance estimator of b is thus given by:
C 0(A0A) 1C
 1
:
In practice, the unknown term eit, F and ri are replaced with their respective consistent
estimators beit = yit   bXitb, bFg = N 1 NP
i=1
TP
t=1
sit bZ 0itb0gr bX 0git and bri. Let qit =
(; zit; zi) the vector of regressors that appear in the rst-step probit. Then,
brit = bH 1t f(qitbt) [1  (qitbt)]g 1 (qitbt)q0it [sit   (qitbt)] ;
where: bH 1t  1N f(qitbt) [1  (qitbt)]g 1 [(qitbt)]2 q0itqit
is the consistent estimator of minus the expected Hessien (see Semykina and Wooldridge,
2005). For each couple i, the brit are stacked to obtain the bri used in equation (13). The
estimated variance estimator is therefore:h
C 0( bA0 bA) 1Ci 1 :
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B Estimation with endogenous marriage
Table 10: The effects of marriage on female and male domestic and market work hours -
Pooled GMM estimates, marriage is endogenous (Alternative specication, Model 4)
No children under two
hf lf hm lm
Married 6.831 -1.982 2.293 0.109
(0.801) (0.377) (0.414) (0.269)
Log female wage -1.618 1.144 -0.448 -0.974
(2.023) (0.923) (1.125) (0.717)
Log male wage 2.893 -1.101 -0.553 1.212
(1.433) (0.663) (0.832) (0.553)
Non-labor income -0.042 0.022 0.051 -0.018
(0.043) (0.020) (0.028) (0.017)
Children under 5 2.813 -0.911 0.914 0.158
(0.229) (0.101) (0.135) (0.081)
Children 5+ 1.114 -0.403 0.247 -0.013
(0.11) (0.049) (0.06) (0.037)
Middle regions 0.449 -0.061 -0.022 -0.018
(0.149) (0.075) (0.082) (0.053)
Southern regions 0.334 -0.013 -0.057 -0.006
(0.118) (0.057) (0.063) (0.041)
German00 -0.929 0.502 -0.418 0.344
(0.493) (0.222) (0.276) (0.162)
German10 -0.243 -0.011 -0.184 0.261
(0.316) (0.142) (0.175) (0.091)
German01 0.166 -0.216 -0.161 0.249
(0.329) (0.137) (0.186) (0.109)
Cohort 1931-45 0.934 -0.169 0.075 -0.111
(0.298) (0.163) (0.164) (0.111)
Cohort 1946-55 0.329 0.022 -0.041 0.021
(0.17) (0.085) (0.098) (0.059)
Cohort 1966-79 -0.081 0.046 -0.005 0.079
(0.204) (0.085) (0.105) (0.067)
Age 10 2 -0.241 0.014 -0.069 -0.007
(0.031) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011)
Intercept -1.697 7.671 4.454 4.771
(4.057) (1.937) (2.325) (1.459)
Wald test bit 120.481 51.919 128.912 47.715
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Wald test bzit 116.848 21.15 78.424 26.223
P-value 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.010
Sargan test 119:711
P-Value 0:028
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefcients in bold are signicant at the ve percent level.
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Table 11: Alternative samples: the effects of married life on the female-to-male domestic
and market work hours (log) ratios - Pooled GMM estimates, marriage is endogenous
(Base specication, Model 1)
No children under ve No children under eleven
rh = h
f
hm
rl = l
f
lm
rh = h
f
hm
rl = l
f
lm
Married 0.516 -0.506 0.382 -0.431
(0.172) (0.113) (0.155) (0.096)
Log wage ratio -0.767 0.625 -0.254 -0.105
(0.357) (0.23) (0.327) (0.214)
Non-labor income -0.041 0.020 -0.039 0.006
(0.014) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009)
Children 5+ 0.159 -0.111 0.108 -0.076
(0.026) (0.018) (0.024) (0.013)
Middle regions 0.106 -0.019 0.112 -0.027
(0.033) (0.023) (0.033) (0.027)
Southern regions 0.117 -0.010 0.119 0.004
(0.027) (0.019) (0.029) (0.021)
German00 0.089 0.051 -0.032 0.179
(0.098) (0.076) (0.097) (0.089)
German10 0.053 -0.052 0.023 0.011
(0.052) (0.046) (0.056) (0.063)
German01 0.115 -0.120 0.035 -0.080
(0.061) (0.050) (0.062) (0.053)
Cohort 1931-45 0.067 0.019 0.002 -0.001
(0.059) (0.042) (0.066) (0.050)
Cohort 1946-55 0.053 0.016 0.014 0.014
(0.036) (0.026) (0.040) (0.031)
Cohort 1966-79 -0.052 -0.034 -0.114 -0.010
(0.044) (0.029) (0.051) (0.032)
Intercept 0.488 0.408 0.800 0.039
(0.412) (0.283) (0.425) (0.296)
Wald test bit 36.461 31.775 20.602 39.982
P-value 0.019 0.062 0.483 0.007
Wald test zit 21.05 26.105 23.813 28.003
P-value 0.033 0.006 0.014 0.003
Sargan test 45:517 43:039
P-Value 0:654 0:747
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefcients in bold are signicant at the ve percent level.
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C The permanent effects of the transition to marriage
Table 12: The permanent effects of the transition to marriage on the female-to-male
domestic and market work hours (log) ratios - Pooled GMM estimates, marriage is ex-
ogenous
No children No children No children
under two under ve under eleven
rh = h
f
hm
rl = l
f
lm
rh = h
f
hm
rl = l
f
lm
rh = h
f
hm
rl = l
f
lm
Change 0.150 -0.099 0.113 -0.091 0.086 -0.082
(0.049) (0.029) (0.049) (0.030) (0.048) (0.025)
Log wage ratio -1.026 0.690 -0.946 0.633 -0.293 -0.099
(0.345) (0.219) (0.331) (0.211) (0.326) (0.195)
Non-labor income -0.021 0.005 -0.017 0.005 -0.028 -0.005
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.009)
Dur2 0.006 -0.075 -0.007 -0.064 -0.062 -0.008
(0.033) (0.020) (0.034) (0.021) (0.037) (0.02)
Dur3 0.025 -0.090 0.063 -0.105 -0.036 -0.014
(0.046) (0.030) (0.047) (0.030) (0.046) (0.029)
Dur4 0.024 -0.114 0.042 -0.114 0.101 -0.164
(0.059) (0.038) (0.059) (0.038) (0.059) (0.040)
Dur5 -0.014 -0.078 0.014 -0.081 0.089 -0.161
(0.068) (0.042) (0.069) (0.043) (0.073) (0.050)
Children under 5 0.263 -0.281
(0.050) (0.033)
Children 5+ 0.128 -0.096 0.131 -0.093 0.096 -0.061
(0.024) (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.022) (0.013)
Middle regions 0.072 0.010 0.088 -0.004 0.101 -0.016
(0.032) (0.022) (0.032) (0.022) (0.031) (0.026)
Southern regions 0.089 0.005 0.107 0.002 0.107 0.019
(0.025) (0.016) (0.025) (0.017) (0.027) (0.020)
German00 0.116 0.031 0.136 0.021 -0.023 0.166
(0.090) (0.069) (0.093) (0.071) (0.093) (0.086)
German10 -0.009 -0.039 0.016 -0.046 -0.001 0.024
(0.051) (0.041) (0.049) (0.042) (0.052) (0.062)
German01 0.127 -0.111 0.117 -0.109 0.036 -0.076
(0.059) (0.046) (0.060) (0.047) (0.059) (0.051)
Cohort 1931-45 0.146 -0.017 0.107 -0.018 -0.011 0.0184
(0.065) (0.044) (0.064) (0.043) (0.065) (0.051)
Cohort 1946-55 0.081 0.006 0.064 0.008 -0.001 0.026
(0.036) (0.024) (0.036) (0.024) (0.037) (0.029)
Cohort 1966-79 -0.104 0.012 -0.091 -0.004 -0.145 0.026
(0.039) (0.024) (0.041) (0.025) (0.046) (0.026)
Intercept 0.513 0.438 0.685 0.208 0.965 -0.135
(0.378) (0.256) (0.372) (0.259) (0.382) (0.273)
Sargan test 47:324 50:049 52:838
P-Value 0:500 0:392 0:293
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefcients in bold are signicant at the ve percent level.
28
References
Anderberg, Dan, Voluntary Income Sharing and the Design of Unemployment Insur-
ance, Journal of Population Economics 16 (2003), 71-90.
Apps, Patricia F., and Ray Rees, Taxation and the Household, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 35:3 (1988), 355-369.
Basu, Kaushik, Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously
Determined Balance of Power, Economic Journal 116 (2006), 558-580.
Becker, Gary, A Theory of Marriage: Part I, Journal of Political Economy, 81:4 (1973),
813-846.
Blundell Richard, Pierre-André Chiappori, Thierry Magnac, and Costas Meghir, Col-
lective Labour Supply : Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation, IZA Discussion Paper
No. 1785 (2005).
Blundell Richard, Alan Duncan and Costas Meghir, Estimating Labor Supply Re-
sponses Using Tax Reforms, Econometrica 66:4 (1998), 827-861.
Brien, Michael J., Lee . A. Lillard, and Steven Stern, Interrelated Family-Building
Behaviors: Cohabitation, Marriage, and Nonmarital Conception, Demography 36:4
(1999), 535-551.
Brien, Michael J., Lee . A. Lillard, and Steven Stern, Cohabitation, Marriage, and Di-
vorce in a Model of Match Quality, International Economic Review 47:2 (2006),
451-494.
Browning, Martin, Children and Household Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic
Literature 30:3 (1992), 1434-1475.
Browning, Martin, and Mette Gørtz, Spending time and money within the household,
Discussion Papers Series 288, University of Oxford, (2006).
Bumpass, Larry L., Sweet, James A., Cohabitation, marriage, and union stability: pre-
liminary ndings from NSFH2 NSFH Working Paper No. 65 (1995).
Chiappori, Pierre-André, Rational Household Labor Supply, Econometrica 56:1
(1988), 6390.
Chiappori, Pierre-André, Bernard Fortin, and Guy Lacroix, Marriage Market, Divorce
Legislation and Household Labour Supply, Journal of Political Economy 110:1
(2002), 3772.
Cohen, Philipp K., Cohabitation and the Declining Marriage Premium for Men, Work
and Occupations 29:3 (2002), 346-363.
Couprie, Hélène,Time allocation within the family: welfare implications of life in a
couple, The Economic Journal 117:1 (2007), 287-305.
29
Davies H., H. Joshi, M. Killingsworth and R. Peronaci, How do couples spend their
time? Hours of market and domestic, work time in British partnerships, in S.
Gustafsson and D. Meulders (Eds.), Gender and the Labour Market: Economet-
ric Evidence on Obstacles in Achieving Gender Equality (Basingstoke, Macmillan,
2000).
DeLeire, Thomas, and Ariel Kalil, How Do Cohabiting Couples With Children Spend
Their Money?, Journal of Marriage and the Family 67:2 (2005), 286-295.
Deutsches Jugendinstitut, Zahlenspiegel. daten zu tageseinrichtungen für kinder Fact
book on daycare facilities for children, Muenchen, Germany: Deutsches Jugendin-
stitut (2002).
Donni, Olivier, Collective Female Labor Supply: Theory and Application, The Eco-
nomic Journal 117:1 (2007), 94-119.
Donni, Olivier, and Nicolas Moreau, Collective Labor Supply: A Single-Equation
Model and Some Evidence from French Data, Journal of Human Resources 42:1
(2007), 214-246.
Dustmann, Christian, and María Engracia Rochina-Barrachina, Selection Correction in
Panel Data Models: An Application to Labour Supply and Wages, IZA Working
Paper No. 162 (2000).
Gonzalez-Chapela, Jorge, On the price of recreation goods as a determinant of female
labor supply, Mimeo (2004).
Gornick, Janet C., andMarcia K. Meyers, Families That Work: Policies for Reconciling
Parenthood and Employment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003).
Gray, Jeffrey S., The Fall in Men's Return to Marriage: Declining Productivity Effects
or Changing Selection?, The Journal of Human Resources 22:3 (1997), 481-504.
Gustafsson, Siv, (1992). Separate taxation and married women's labor supply. A com-
parison ofWest Germany and Sweden, Journal of Population Economics 5:1 (1992),
61-85.
Kiker, B. F., and Ying Chun Ng, A Simultaneous Equation Model of Spousal Time
Allocation, Social Science Research 19 (1990), 132-152.
Kooreman, Peter, and Arie Kapteyn, A Disaggregated Analysis of the Allocation of
Time Within the Household, The Journal of Political Economy 95:2 (1987), 223-
249.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J., and Avia Spivak, The Family as an Incomplete Annuites Mar-
ket, Journal of Political Economy 89:2 (1981), 372-391.
Kyriazidou, Ekaterini, Estimation of a panel data sample selection model, Economet-
rica 65 (1997), 1335-1364.
Laisney, François, Michael Lechner, Arthur van Soest and Gerhard Wagenhals, A life
cycle labour supply model with taxes estimated on German panel data, The Eco-
nomic and Social Review 24 (1993), 335-369.
30
Le Goff, Jean-Marie, Cohabiting Unions in France and West Germany, Demographic
Research 7:18 (2002), 593-624.
Lillard, Lee A., Brien, Michael J., and Steven Stern, Premarital Cohabitation and Sub-
sequent Marital Dissolution: AMatter of Self-Selection?,Demography 32:3 (1995),
437-457.
Lundberg, Shelly, Men in islands: Dealing with the family in empirical labor eco-
nomics, Labor Economics, 12:4 (2005), 591-612.
Lundberg, Shelly, Limits to Specialization: Efciency and the Division of Labor in
Modern Families, working paper University of Washington, (2002).
Lundberg, Shelly, The Division of Labor Supply by new Parents: Does Child Gender
Matter?, working paper University of Washington, (2005).
Lundberg, Shelly, and Elaina Rose, The effects of sons and daughters on men's labor
supply and wages The Review of Economic and Statistics 84:2 (2002), 251-268.
Mamun, Arif, Is There a Cohabitation Premium in Men's Earnings?, Center for Re-
search on Families, working Paper 2004-02 (2004).
McConocha, Diane M., Shirlee A. Tully, and Carl H. Walther, Household Money Man-
agement: Recognizing Nontraditional Couples, Journal of Consumer Affairs 27:2
(1993), 258-283.
McElroy, Marjorie B., and Mary Jean Horney, Nash-bargained household decisions:
toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand, International Economic Review,
22:2 (1981), 333-349.
Mundlak, Yair., On the pooling of time series and cross section data, Econometrica 46
(1978), 69-85.
Nordblom, Katarina, Cohabitation and Marriage in a Risky World, Review of Eco-
nomics of the Household 2 (2004), 325-340.
Pencavel, John, A life cycle perspective on changes in earnings inequality among mar-
ried men and women, The Review of Economic and Statistics 88:2 (2006), 232-242.
Pollak, Robert A., and Michael L.Wachter, The Relevance of the Household Production
Function and Its Implications for the Allocation of Time, The Journal of Political
Economy 83:2 (1975), 255-278.
Rangel, Marcos A., Alimony Rights and Intrahousehold Allocation of Resources: Evi-
dence From Brazil, The Economic Journal 116: July, (2006), 627-658.
Semykina, Anastasia, and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Estimating panel data models in
the presence of endogeneity and selection: Theory and application, Working Pa-
per Michigan State University (2005).
South, Scott J., and Glenna Spitze, Housework in marital and nonmarital households,
American Sociological Review 59:3 (1994), 327-437.
Steiner, Viktor, and Peter Jacobebbinghaus, Reforming Social Welfare as We Know It?
A Microsimulation Study for Germany, Working Paper (2003).
31
Stintzing, Heike, Constitutional values and social change - the case of german marital
and family law, Institutional Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 13 (1999), 132-
146.
Stratton, Leslie S., Examining the Wage Differential for Married and Cohabiting Men,
Economic Inquiry 40:2 (2002), 199-212.
Stratton, Leslie S., The Degree of Intrahousehold Specialization in Housework and
How Specialization Varies Across Couple Households, (2005), paper presented at
the June 2005 SOLE Meetings.
Van Der Klaauw, Wilbert, Female Labour Supply and Marital Status Decisions: A Life
Cycle-Model, The Review of Economic Studies 63:2 (1996), 199-235.
Waite, Linda J., Does Marriage matter?, Demography 32:4 (1995), 483-507.
Wells, Robin, and Maria Maher, Time and Surplus Allocation Within Marriage, work-
ing paper Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1998).
Wrede, Matthias, The Income Splitting Method: Is it Good for Both Marriage Part-
ners?, German Economic Review 4(2): (2003), 203-216.
32
